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Abstract—The existing research on physical layer security
commonly assumes the number of eavesdropper antennas to be
known. Although this assumption allows one to easily compute
the achievable secrecy rate, it can hardly be realized in practice.
In this paper, we provide an innovative approach to study secure
communication systems without knowing the number of eaves-
dropper antennas by introducing the concept of spatial constraint
into physical layer security. Specifically, the eavesdropper is
assumed to have a limited spatial region to place (possibly an
infinite number of) antennas. From a practical point of view,
knowing the spatial constraint of the eavesdropper is much easier
than knowing the number of eavesdropper antennas. We derive
the achievable secrecy rates of the spatially-constrained system
with and without friendly jamming. We show that a non-zero
secrecy rate is achievable with the help of a friendly jammer, even
if the eavesdropper places an infinite number of antennas in its
spatial region. Furthermore, we find that the achievable secrecy
rate does not monotonically increase with the jamming power,
and hence, we obtain the closed-form solution of the optimal
jamming power that maximizes the secrecy rate.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secrecy capacity, friendly
jamming, spatial constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
DUE to the rapid adoption of wireless technologies inmodern life, an unprecedented amount of private infor-
mation is transmitted in wireless medium. Consequently, com-
munication security has become a critical issue due to the un-
alterable open nature of wireless channels. As a complement to
the traditional cryptographic technique, physical layer security
has been extensively studied [1, 2] to secure wireless commu-
nications by exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels.
Wyner introduced the wiretap-channel system as a framework
for the physical layer security in his seminal work [3], and
defined the secrecy capacity as the maximum rate at which
messages can be reliably sent to the intended receiver without
being eavesdropped. This result was then generalized to the
broadcast channel with confidential messages by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [4] and the Gaussian wiretap channel by Leung-Yan-
Cheong and Hellman [5]. In recent years, the fast development
of multi-input multi-output (MIMO) techniques has triggered
a considerable amount of attention on physical layer security
in multi-antenna systems, where the transmitter, the receiver
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and/or the eavesdropper are equipped with multiple antennas.
For example, the secrecy capacity of the multi-antenna system
was analyzed in [6–8] and signal processing techniques with
multiple antennas for improving the secrecy performance were
proposed in [9–13].
Despite a significant amount of work has been done on
physical layer security, most research in this area is theoret-
ically oriented due to the idealized and impractical assump-
tions. For instance, many existing articles assumed that the
transmitter has perfect channel state information (CSI) for the
channels to the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. In
practice, an external eavesdropper naturally does not cooperate
with the transmitter to send CSI feedback, and hence, it is
very difficult for the transmitter to obtain the CSI of the
eavesdropper. Although the intended receiver may cooperate to
send CSI feedback, reliable uplink channels for the feedback
cannot always be guaranteed. This leads to an increasing
amount of recent work focusing on the scenario where the
transmitter does not have perfect CSI of the channel to the
intended receiver and/or the eavesdropper, e.g., [14–18] and
references within.
Apart from the assumption of perfect CSI knowledge,
another idealized assumption is often adopted in the existing
literature on physical layer security in multi-antenna systems,
i.e., the assumption of knowing the number of eavesdropper
antennas or setting an upper bound on the number of eaves-
dropper antennas. If the number of eavesdropper antennas is
unknown, we have to assume that the eavesdropper has an
infinite number of antennas as a worst-case consideration, and
then the secrecy rate would always go to zero intuitively. To
the best of the authors’ knowledge, no existing literature has
studied the scenario where the number of eavesdropper anten-
nas is totally unknown. In practice, an external eavesdropper
naturally does not inform the legitimate side about the number
of antennas to expose its ability. As a weak justification, the
upper bound on the number of eavesdropper antennas could be
estimated from the eavesdropper’s device size. However, such
a weak justification, probably valid in the past, can no longer
hold with the current development of large-scale antenna array
technologies which allow a fast growing number of antennas
be placed within a limited space. Thus, how to characterize
the performance of physical layer security without knowing
the number of eavesdropper antennas is a challenging but
important problem.
2B. Our Approach and Contributions
In this work, we provide an innovative solution to the
challenging problem by introducing the concept of spatial
constraint1 into physical layer security. In practice, knowing
the eavesdropper’s spatial constraint for placing antennas is
much easier than knowing the exact number of the eaves-
dropper antennas. For example, we may know the size of the
eavesdropper’s device, but it is difficult to know how many
antennas are installed on the device. We may know that the
eavesdropper hides in a room, but it is difficult to known
how many antennas are placed inside the room. In addition,
considering a spatial constraint instead of an exact location
of the eavesdropper allows certain degrees of uncertainty in
eavesdropper’s location.
We focus on the effects of spatial constraints at the receiver
side. Specifically, we consider the scenario where the transmit-
ter has a large number of antennas without spatial constraint
while both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper have
spatial constraints to place the receive antennas. This is a valid
assumption given less geometrical size restriction for the base
station to place a large number of transmit antennas, while
the size of receiving device in the downlink is often relatively
small [19]. Importantly, the number of receive antennas at
the eavesdropper may not be known. We consider a simple
and practical CSI assumption that the instantaneous CSI is
known at the receiver end (the intended receiver and the
eavesdropper) but not at the transmitter. Under these assump-
tions and considerations, we derive the secrecy capacity of
the spatially-constrained multi-antenna system, and study the
potential benefits brought by two widely-adopted friendly-
jamming techniques. The two friendly-jamming techniques
studied are the basic jamming technique and the artificial
noise (AN) jamming technique: the former degrades both the
intended receiver and the eavesdropper’s channels, while the
latter degrades only the eavesdropper’s channel but does not
affect the intended receiver’s channel. We find that a non-zero
secrecy capacity is achievable for the spatially-constrained
system with the help of friendly-jamming signals, even if the
number of eavesdropper antennas is unknown and considered
to be infinity as a worst case.
The primary contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
1) We introduce spatial constraints into physical layer se-
curity. To this end, we propose a framework to study
physical layer security in multi-antenna systems with
spatial constraints at the receiver side (both the intended
receiver and the eavesdropper). We derive the secrecy
capacity, and analyze the impact of spatial constraints
on the secrecy capacity.
2) For the first time, our proposed framework allows one
to analyze physical layer security without the knowledge
of the number of eavesdropper antennas. It relaxes the
requirement on the knowledge of eavesdropper from
knowing the number of antennas to knowing the spatial
constraint. We show that a non-zero secrecy capacity is
1Here the spatial constraint means the limited size of the spatial region for
placing antennas at the communication node.
achievable even if the eavesdropper is assumed to have
an infinite number of antennas. This is easily achieved
by applying the basic friendly-jamming technique where
the jammer sends random noise signals.
3) We further study the impact of jamming power on the
secrecy capacity of the spatially-constrained jammer-
assisted systems. For the basic jammer-assisted system,
we find that the secrecy capacity does not monotonically
increase with the jamming power, and we obtain the
closed-form solution of the optimal jamming power that
maximizes the secrecy capacity. The optimality of the
obtained solution is confirmed by the numerical result.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes system models for studying physical layer
security with spatial constraints at the receiver side. In Sec-
tion III, we first give the secrecy capacity of the proposed
systems with the knowledge of the number of eavesdropper
antennas. The important case of not knowing the number
of eavesdropper antennas is studied in Section IV, where
the eavesdropper’s receiver is assumed to be noise free and
allowed to have infinitely many antennas for the worst-case
consideration. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and
discusses possible future research directions.
Throughout the paper, we adopt the following nota-
tions: Scalars, vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-
case/uppercase letters, boldface lowercase letters and boldface
uppercase letters, respectively, the circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian vector with mean µ and covariance matrix C is
denoted by CN (µ,C), IN denotes the N×N identity matrix,
()H denotes the conjugate transpose of a vector or a matrix,
|X| denotes the determinant of matrix X, E{·} denotes the
expectation operator, ⌈·⌉ and ⌊·⌋ denote the ceiling operator
and the floor operator, respectively, [x]+ = max(x, 0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we study physical layer security in multi-
antenna systems with spatial constraints at the receiver side.
We assume that all communication nodes are equipped with
multiple antennas and there exist spatial constraints at both the
intended receiver and the eavesdropper. That is, the intended
receiver and the eavesdropper have limited sizes of spatial
regions for placing the receive antennas. To focus on the
impact of spatial constraints at the receiver side, we adopt the
following two assumptions as briefly mentioned in Section I.
Firstly, we assume that there is no spatial constraint at the
transmitter side for placing transmit antennas. Secondly, we
assume that the transmitter has a large number of transmit
antennas, and hence the capacity of the channel from the
transmitter to the receiver is mainly restricted by the receiver
side. Note that the number of antennas at the base station is
often predicted to be in the hundreds for the next generation
wireless systems [20, 21]. These two assumptions were often
adopted in the literature investigating the impact of spatial
constraints at the receiver side on multi-antenna systems
without secrecy considerations, e.g., [19, 22–24] studying the
channel capacity and [25–28] studying the spatial degrees
of freedom. We specifically investigate two different secure
3Fig. 1. 2D model for the wiretap-channel system
communication systems, which are the wiretap-channel sys-
tem and the jammer-assisted system. For the jammer-assisted
system, we further consider two different cases depending on
the adopted jamming technique, namely basic jammer-assisted
system and AN jammer-assisted system. The details of the
system models are given in the following subsections.
A. Wiretap-Channel System
The wiretap-channel system consists of a transmitter, an
intended receiver and an eavesdropper, with Nt, Nb and Ne
antennas, respectively. The transmitter, Alice, sends confiden-
tial messages to the intended receiver, Bob, in the presence
of the eavesdropper, Eve. The receive antennas at Bob and
Eve are both spatially constrained. Alice is assumed to be
a base station with a large number of antennas (Nt → ∞)
without a spatial constraint. For the 2D analysis, Bob and Eve
are assumed to be spatially constrained by circular apertures
with radii rb and re, respectively. For the 3D analysis, Bob
and Eve are assumed to be spatially constrained by spherical
apertures with radii rb and re, respectively. The 2D model of
the wiretap-channel system is depicted in Figure 1.
The received signal vector at Bob or Eve is given by
yi =
√
αiHix+ ni i = b or e, (1)
where the subscripts b and e denote the parameters for Bob and
Eve, respectively, x denotes the transmitted signal vector from
Alice with an average power of Pt, i.e., E
{
xHx
}
= Pt. In ad-
dition, ni ∼ CN
(
0, σ2i I
)
denotes the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) vector at Bob or Eve, Hi = [hi1hi2 · · ·hiNt ]
denotes the Ni × Nt normalized channel matrix from Alice
to Bob or Eve with hik (k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nt}) representing the
Ni × 1 complex zero-mean Gaussian vector of the channel
gains corresponding to the kth transmit antenna at Alice.
Moreover, αi denotes the average channel gain from Alice
to Bob or Eve, which is often determined by the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver. Besides, we assume
that Bob and Eve perfectly know their CSI, while Alice does
not know either Bob or Eve’s instantaneous CSI.
The correlation matrix at the receiver is defined as
Ri = E
{
hith
H
it
}
, (2)
Fig. 2. 2D model for the jammer-assisted system
where the expectation is over all transmit antennas and channel
realizations. We can also write
Ri =


ρi,11 ρi,12 ρi,1Ni
ρi,21 ρi,22
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ρi,Ni1 · · · ρi,NiNi

 , (3)
with elements ρi,kk′ corresponding to the spatial correlation
between two sensors k and k′ at the receiver. The spatial cor-
relation between sensors is mainly determined by the distance
between the sensors. The spatial correlation increases as the
distance between sensors decreases. Within a fixed space, the
distance between the antennas decreases as the number of
antennas increases, and hence, the spatial correlation increases
as the number of antennas increases.
B. Jammer-Assisted System
The jammer-assisted system consists of a transmitter,
a helper, an intended receiver and an eavesdropper, with
Nt, Nj, Nb and Ne antennas, respectively. With the aid of
the helper, Helen, the transmitter, Alice, sends confidential
messages to the intended receiver, Bob, in the presence of the
eavesdropper, Eve. Helen helps Alice by broadcasting friendly
jamming signals. The receive antennas at Bob and Eve are
both spatially constrained. Alice and Helen are assumed to
be base stations with a large number of transmit antennas
(Nt, Nj → ∞) without the spatial constraint. The detailed
assumptions of the spatial constraints on Bob and Eve are the
same as those given in Section II-A. The 2D model of the
jammer-assisted system is depicted in Figure 2.
We assume that Bob and Eve perfectly know their CSI,
and Alice does not know either Bob or Eve’s instantaneous
CSI. We further assume that Helen does not know Eve’s in-
stantaneous CSI, since the passive eavesdropper does not feed
back the CSI to the helper. Moreover, for Helen’s knowledge
about Bob’s channel, we consider two different cases in order
to study two widely-adopted friendly-jamming techniques, as
will be detailed next.
1) Case 1: Basic Jammer-Assisted System: In the first case,
we assume that Helen does not know Bob’s instantaneous
CSI. This happens when there is no reliable uplink channel
4from Bob to Helen for CSI feedback. In this case, Helen
broadcasts basic jamming signals that degrade both Bob and
Eve’s channels.
The received signal vector at Bob or Eve is given by
yi =
√
αiHix+
√
βiGiw1 + ni, i = b or e, (4)
where x, αi,Hi,ni and the subscripts b, e follow (1). In addi-
tion, w1 denotes the basic jamming signal vector transmitted
from Helen with an average power of Pj , i.e., E
{
wH1 w1
}
=
Pj , and Gi =
[
gi1gi2 · · ·giNj
]
denotes the normalized
channel matrix from Helen to Bob or Eve with gik (k ∈
{1, 2, · · · , Nj}) representing the Ni × 1 complex zero-mean
Gaussian vector of the channel gains corresponding to the kth
transmit antenna at Helen. Moreover, βi denotes the average
channel gain from Helen to Bob or Eve.
2) Case 2: AN Jammer-Assisted System: In the second case,
we assume that Helen perfectly knows the instantaneous CSI
from herself to Bob. This happens when there exists a reliable
uplink channel from Bob to Helen for CSI feedback. In such a
case, Helen broadcasts AN jamming signals that degrade Eve’s
channel but do not affect Bob’s channel. The AN jamming
technique was proposed in [9], which is often applied in secure
communication networks where the jammer has the CSI to the
intended receiver. Specifically, the AN jamming signal vector
from Helen, denoted by w2, is chosen to lie in the null space
of the channel to the intended receiver, Gb. That is Gbw2 = 0.
In particular, w2 can be constructed by
w2 = Zv, (5)
where v is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
complex Gaussian random variable vector, the Nj×(Nj−Nb)
matrix Z denotes the orthonormal basis of the null space of
Gb with ZHZ = I.
With the AN jamming signals, the received signal vectors
at Bob and Eve are given by
yb =
√
αbHbx+
√
βbGbw2 + nb =
√
αbHbx+ nb (6)
and
ye =
√
αeHex+
√
βeGew2 + ne
=
√
αeHex+
√
βeGeZv + ne, (7)
respectively, where, once again, x, αb, αe,Hb,He,nb,ne fol-
low (1) and βb, βe,Gb,Ge follow (4). Besides, the av-
erage transmit power at Helen is still given by Pj , i.e.,
E
{
wH2 w2
}
= Pj .
Remark 1: We highlight that the analysis for the AN
jammer-assisted system is mainly motivated by its importance
from the theoretical point of view. The basic jamming and
the AN jamming are the two most widely-studied physical-
layer techniques to improve the secrecy performance of multi-
antenna systems. In this work, we study the wireless physical
layer security with spatial constraints at the receiver side. It
is of significant importance to investigate the benefits brought
by both of the jamming techniques in the spatially-constrained
systems. The AN jamming technique is often studied in the
scenario where both Alice and Helen have the legitimate CSI
in the literature. The legitimate CSI available at Alice enables
not only the injection of AN jamming signals but also the
transmit beamforming, and the secrecy capacity will go to
infinity under the assumption of infinitely large number of
transmit antennas. This will be shown later in Section III. In
order to investigate the capacity improvement solely brought
by AN jamming, we assume that Alice does not know the
instantaneous CSI to Bob, but Helen knows the instantaneous
CSI to Bob. Besides, the practical value of the AN jammer-
assisted system studied in this paper can be seen from the fol-
lowing scenario as an example: We can consider that Alice is a
base station owned by company A to serve a mobile user, Bob.
Helen is another base station owned by company B. Due to
particular reasons, e.g., location or surrounding environment,
the CSI feedback link from Bob to Alice is bad, while the CSI
feedback link from Bob to Helen is good. Then, Alice asks
Helen to help the secrecy transmission by broadcasting AN
jamming signals. For the secrecy concern, company A does
not intend to share the confidential information with company
B, and hence Alice does not share the messages to transmit
with Helen.
III. INTRODUCING SPATIAL CONSTRAINTS INTO SECRECY
CAPACITY CALCULATION
In this section, we derive the secrecy capacity of the systems
with spatial constraints at the receiver side as described in
Section II. The secrecy capacity characterizes the maximum
rate at which messages can be reliably transmitted to Bob
while Eve obtains zero information. It is mathematically
defined by [5]
Cs = [Cb − Ce]+, (8)
where Cb and Ce denote Bob and Eve’s channel capacities,
respectively.
For the multi-antenna systems with spatial constraint at the
receiver, the channel capacity is limited by the rank and the
eigenvalues of the spatial correlation matrix at the receiver.
As the number of antennas increases in a fixed space, the
correlation between antennas increases. The increase in spatial
correlation will limit the number of significant eigenvalues of
the spatial correlation matrix. As more antennas are placed
in the fixed space, they will be highly correlated with other
antennas. As a result, the growth of channel capacity with
respect to the number of receive antennas reduces from linear
to logarithmic. The number of receive antennas at which the
capacity scaling is reduced to logarithmic is approximated
by the saturation number of receive antennas. The saturation
number of receive antennas is given by [19, Chapters 3.3]
N0i =
{
2 ⌈pieri/λ⌉+ 1 , for 2D analysis
(⌈pieri/λ⌉+ 1)2 , for 3D analysis, (9)
where λ denotes the wavelength, e denotes Euler’s number,
and subscript i denotes the parameters for Bob or Eve.2 As
pointed out in [19], the growth of channel capacity (Cb or
Ce) with respect to the number of optimally-placed receive
antennas (Nb or Ne) reduces from linear to logarithmic when
the number of receive antennas increases beyond the saturation
2The detailed derivation of the saturation number of antennas closely
follows [19, Chapters 2.1 and 3].
5number (N0b or N0e). Note that similar “saturation” effects on
the growth of channel capacity with respect to the number of
antennas at the spatially-constrained receiver have also been
pointed out in, e.g., [29–32].
It is worth mentioning that the capacity results in this
paper are approximations based on (9) and the assumption
of infinitely large number of transmit antennas. The accuracy
of the approximations are verified in Appendices. In the rest
of the paper, we simply refer to the approximated capacity
result as the capacity.
A. Secrecy Capacity of Wiretap-Channel System
Proposition 1: The secrecy capacity of the wiretap-channel
system with spatial constraints at the receiver side is given by
Cs = [Cb − Ce]+ where3
Cb =
{
Nb log(1 +
αbPt
σ2
b
) , if Nb ≤ N0b
N0b log(1 +
Nb
N0b
αbPt
σ2
b
) , otherwise, (10)
Ce =
{
Ne log(1 +
αePt
σ2e
) , if Ne ≤ N0e
N0e log(1 +
Ne
N0e
αePt
σ2e
) , otherwise. (11)
Proof: The capacities of the channels to the spatially-
constrained Bob and Eve follow easily from [19, Chapters 2
and 3]. The details are given in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 gives the secrecy capacity of the wiretap-
channel system taking spatial constraints at the receiver side
into account. From Proposition 1, we note that the growth of
secrecy capacity with Nb reduces from linear to logarithmic
once Nb reaches N0b. Also, the decrease of secrecy capacity
with Ne reduces from linear to logarithmic once Ne reaches
N0e. Differently, the secrecy capacity without spatial con-
straint always increases linearly with Nb and decreases linearly
with Ne. This verifies that the secrecy performances of the
networks with and without spatial considerations are different.
B. Secrecy Capacity of Basic Jammer-Assisted System
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of the basic jammer-
assisted system with spatial constraints at the receiver side
is given by Cs = [Cb − Ce]+ where
Cb =


Nb log
(
1 + αbPt
βbPj+σ
2
b
)
, if Nb ≤ N0b
N0b log
(
1 +
Nb
N0b
αbPt
Nb
N0b
βbPj+σ
2
b
)
, otherwise,
(12)
Ce =


Ne log
(
1 + αePt
βePj+σ2e
)
, if Ne ≤ N0e
N0e log
(
1 +
Ne
N0e
αePt
Ne
N0e
βePj+σ2e
)
, otherwise.
(13)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 gives the secrecy capacity of the basic jammer-
assisted system taking spatial constraints at the receiver side
into account. Similar to the result for the wiretap channel, we
note that the secrecy capacity grows in linear with Nb when
Nb ≤ N0b. Also, the secrecy capacity decreases in linear with
3Throughout the paper logarithms are to base two, and the capacity is
therefore in bits/s/Hz.
Ne when Ne ≤ N0e. However, as Ni increases beyond N0i,
the change of secrecy capacity with respect to Ni becomes
slower and slower. The secrecy capacity approaches an upper
bound as Nb →∞, and a (possible) non-zero lower bound as
Ne →∞, since
lim
Nb→∞
Cb = N0b log
(
1 +
αbPt
βbPj
)
(14)
and
lim
Ne→∞
Ce = N0e log
(
1 +
αePt
βePj
)
. (15)
C. Secrecy Capacity of AN Jammer-Assisted System
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity of the AN jammer-
assisted system with spatial constraints at the receiver side
is given by Cs = [Cb − Ce]+ where
Cb =
{
Nb log
(
1 + αbPt
σ2
b
)
, if Nb ≤ N0b
N0b log(1 +
Nb
N0b
αbPt
σ2
b
) , otherwise,
(16)
Ce =


Ne log
(
1 + αePt
βePj+σ2e
)
, if Ne ≤ N0e
N0e log
(
1 +
Ne
N0e
αePt
Ne
N0e
βePj+σ2e
)
, otherwise.
(17)
Proof: The capacity of Bob’s channel is the same as that
for the wiretap-channel system, since the AN jamming signals
do not affect Bob’s channel. We then derive the capacity of
Eve’s channel subject to the AN jamming signals.The details
are given in Appendix C.
Theorem 2 gives the secrecy capacity of the AN jammer-
assisted system taking spatial constraints at the receiver side
into account. We note that the growth of secrecy capacity with
Nb reduces from linear to logarithmic once Nb reaches N0b.
The decrease of secrecy capacity with Ne is in linear when
Ne ≤ N0e, and becomes slower and slower when Ne > N0e.
The secrecy capacity approaches a (possible) non-zero lower
bound as Ne →∞.
D. Secrecy Capacity with Legitimate CSI Available at Alice
In this paper, we consider a simple and practical CSI
assumption that the instantaneous CSI of Bob is not available
at Alice. In fact, it is also possible in practice that Bob’s
CSI is available at Alice. In this subsection, we provide the
analysis on the secrecy capacity of the scenario where both
Alice and Helen have Bob’s CSI. Note that for the scenario
without the friendly jammer, Alice can use a portion of the
transmit antennas for sending information signals and the rest
for broadcasting AN jamming signals. Under the assumption
of Nt → ∞, the scenario without the jammer Helen can be
regarded as the scenario having both Helen and Alice at the
same location.
When Bob’s CSI is available at Alice, Alice can design
the transmit signals accordingly to enhance Bob’s channel
capacity. At the same time, Helen can still transmit the AN
jamming signals that degrade Eve’s channel but do not affect
Bob’s channel. An infinitely large rate at Bob can be achieved
by adopting a simple single-stream beamforming at Alice,
under the assumption that the transmitter has an infinitely
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Fig. 3. Wiretap-channel system: Secrecy capacity versus the number of
Bob’s antennas and the number of Eve’s antennas. Bob and Eve are spatially
constrained by circular apertures with radii rb = 1.5λ and re = 1λ,
respectively.
large number of antennas without the spatial constraint, while
Eve does not benefit from the transmit beamforming. Hence,
the secrecy capacity is equal to infinity in such a scenario
with Bob’s CSI available at Alice. It is worth mentioning
that the secrecy capacity would be finite in a practical system
with spatial constraints at both the transmitter side and the
receiver side, due to the finite degrees of freedom in the
spatially-constraint channel. The derivation of secrecy capacity
in systems with spatial constraints at both the transmitter side
and the receiver side is non-trivial and beyond the scope of
this paper.
E. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we demonstrate the secrecy capacity
versus the number of Bob’s antennas and the number of
Eve’s antennas for different systems. Specifically, the network
parameters are Pt = 20 dB, Pj = 0 dB, αb = 1, αe = 1, βb =
1, βe = 1, σ
2
b = 1, σ
2
e = 1, rb = 1.5λ and re = 1λ. We
adopt the 2D analysis to characterize the spatial constraints
at the receiver side. That is, Bob and Eve are assumed to be
spatially constrained by circular apertures. According to (9),
the saturation numbers of receive antennas for Bob and Eve are
N0b = 2 ⌈pierb/λ⌉+1 = 27 and N0e = 2 ⌈piere/λ⌉+1 = 19,
respectively.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 plot Cs versus Nb and Ne for the wiretap-
channel system, the basic jammer-assisted system and the AN
jammer-assisted system, respectively. As shown in the figures,
Cs increases with Nb and decreases with Ne. The increase of
Cs with Nb slows down once Nb > N0b due to the effect of
spatial constraint at Bob. Similarly, the decrease of Cs with
Ne slows down once Ne > N0e due to the effect of spatial
constraint at Eve. Besides, we note that the achieved secrecy
capacities for different systems are different.
To make a clear comparison between the achieved secrecy
capacities for different systems, we present Figure 6 plotting
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Fig. 4. Basic jammer-assisted system: Secrecy capacity versus the number
of Bob’s antennas and the number of Eve’s antennas. Bob and Eve are
spatially constrained by circular apertures with radii rb = 1.5λ and re = 1λ,
respectively.
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Fig. 5. AN jammer-assisted system: Secrecy capacity versus the number
of Bob’s antennas and the number of Eve’s antennas. Bob and Eve are
spatially constrained by circular apertures with radii rb = 1.5λ and re = 1λ,
respectively.
Cs versus Ne with a given value of Nb = 35. As shown in
the figure, the secrecy capacity of the wiretap-channel system
decreases fast as the number of Eve’s antennas increases. We
find that the secrecy capacity of the wiretap-channel system
goes to zero as the number of Eve’s antennas continues to
increase. Comparing the wiretap-channel system and the basic
jammer-assisted system, we note that introducing the basic
jamming signals effectively slows down the decrease of Cs
when Ne > N0e. Thus, the basic jammer-assisted system
achieves a higher secrecy capacity compared with the wiretap-
channel system when the number of Eve’s antennas is large.
In addition, as analyzed in Section III-B, the secrecy capacity
of the basic jammer-assisted system can approach a non-zero
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Fig. 6. Secrecy capacity versus the number of eavesdropper antennas with
Nb = 35. Bob and Eve are spatially constrained by circular apertures with
radii rb = 1.5λ and re = 1λ, respectively.
lower bound as Ne →∞. Besides, we observe from the figure
that the secrecy capacity achieved by the basic jammer-assisted
system is less than that achieved by the wiretap-channel system
when Ne is small. This is actually because the jamming power
has not been optimally designed for the results in the figure.
Comparing the wiretap-channel system and the AN jammer-
assisted system, we find that the AN jammer-assisted system
always obtains a higher secrecy capacity than that of the
wiretap-channel system. This is because the AN jamming
signals degrade Eve’s channel only, but do not affect Bob’s
channel. However, we should note that broadcasting the AN
jamming signals requires the helper to know the instantaneous
CSI of the intended receiver, which is not always possible in
practice.
IV. WORST-CASE ANALYSIS FOR JAMMER-ASSISTED
SYSTEMS
The previous section provides the basic analysis on the
secure communication systems with spatial constraints at the
receiver side. However, to evaluate the system performance by
the capacity results given in Proposition 1, Theorems 1 and 2,
we require very good knowledge on Eve, including Ne and σ2e .
In practice, it is desirable to be able to investigate the secrecy
performance of a system without the knowledge of Ne and σ2e .
To this end, we consider a “worst-case eavesdropper” (from
the legitimate users’ perspective) as in this section.
For such a worst-case eavesdropper, we assume that the
number of receive antennas at the eavesdropper approaches
infinity and the noise variance at the eavesdropper approaches
zero, i.e, Ne → ∞ and σ2e → 0. Then, the secrecy capacity
with the worst-case consideration is given by
Cws = lim
Ne→∞,σ2e→0
Cs, (18)
where Cs is the secrecy capacity of systems with perfect
knowledge of Ne and σ2e , i.e, the secrecy capacity derived
in the previous section. In addition, we refer to Cws as the
worst-case secrecy capacity.
The worst-case scenario is motivated by the fact that the
eavesdropper’s ability is difficult to be known or controlled
by the legitimate side. As such, in the design of secure
communications, we assume the worst-case scenario where
the eavesdropper can deploy infinite number of antennas
with arbitrarily small noise variance. If we assume that the
eavesdropper has a given number of antennas, the designed
secure communications would be vulnerable to eavesdropping
caused by a larger number of antennas at the eavesdropper in
practice. Therefore, the weaker assumption of knowing a finite
number of antennas at the eavesdropper cannot lead to the true
guarantee of security, and thus it is of critical significance to
take into consideration the worst-case scenario with infinite
number of eavesdropper antennas.
A. Wiretap-Channel System
Based on Proposition 1 and (18), the worst-case secrecy
capacity of the wiretap-channel system is given by
Cws = 0. (19)
We note that a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity is not
achievable under any condition for the wiretap-channel system,
because the capacity of Eve’s channel always goes to infinity
with Ne →∞ or σ2e → 0.
B. Basic Jammer-Assisted System
1) Worst-Case Secrecy Capacity: Based on Theorem 1
and (18), the worst-case secrecy capacity of the basic jammer-
assisted system is given by
Cws =


[
Nb log
(
1 + αbPt
βbPj+σ
2
b
)
−N0e log
(
1 + αePt
βePj
)]+
,
if Nb ≤ N0b[
N0b log
(
1 +
Nb
N0b
αbPt
Nb
N0b
βbPj+σ
2
b
)
−N0e log
(
1 + αePt
βePj
)]+
,
otherwise.
(20)
From (20), we note that a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity
sometimes is achievable for the basic jammer-assisted system
depending on the system parameters, such as transmit power,
average channel gains, the spatial constraint at Bob and the
number of antennas at Bob. This result shows for the first
time that a non-zero secrecy rate can be achieved even if
the eavesdropper’s receiver itself is noise free and allowed
to have infinitely many antennas. Moreover, this is achieved
by simply asking a friendly-jamming node to send random
jamming signals.
To further study the condition for having a non-zero worst-
case secrecy capacity, we consider the scenario where the num-
ber of antennas at Bob, Nb, is controllable and the other system
parameters4, i.e., N0b, N0e, αb, βb, αe, βe, Pt and Pj , are fixed.
From (20), we find that a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity
is always achievable by having “enough” receive antennas
4Here the other system parameters depend on the spatial constraint, the
location of communication node and the transmit power.
8at Bob when N0b log
(
1 + αbPt
βbPj
)
> N0e log
(
1 + αePt
βePj
)
.
However, the secrecy capacity is always equal to zero when
N0b log
(
1 +
αbPt
βbPj
)
≤ N0e log
(
1 +
αePt
βePj
)
, (21)
because Cb < N0b log
(
1 + αbPt
βbPj
)
always holds for any
finite value of Nb. In addition, when N0b log
(
1 + αbPt
βbPj
)
>
N0e log
(
1 + αePt
βePj
)
, we can further derive the minimum Nb
to ensure a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity as
Nb,min =


N0e log(1+αePtβePj )
log
(
1+
αbPt
βbPj+σ
2
b
)
+ 1 ,
if N0b log
(
1 + αbPt
βbPj+σ
2
b
)
≥ N0e log
(
1 + αePt
βePj
)
 N0b σb
2
((
1+
αePt
βePj
)N0e
N0b −1
)
αbPt+βbPj−βbPj
(
1+
αePt
βePj
)N0e
N0b
+ 1 ,
otherwise.
(22)
2) Optimal Jamming Power: From (20), we note that the
worst-case secrecy capacity is not a monotonically increasing
function of the jamming power. This is because the increase
of Pj degrades not only Eve’s channel but also Bob’s channel,
and there arises a tradeoff between maintaining the capacity of
Bob’s channel and decreasing the capacity of Eve’s channel.
In the following, we determine the optimal jamming power
that maximizes the worst-case secrecy capacity, i.e., P oj =
argmaxPj C
w
s .
Proposition 2: The optimal jamming power that maximizes
the worst-case secrecy capacity of the basic jammer-assisted
system is given by
P oj =


x1, if Nb ≤ N0b, f1(x1) > 0, x1 is real and positive
x2, if Nb ≤ N0b, f2(x2) > 0, x2 is real and positive
x3, if Nb ≤ N0b, f3(x3) > 0, x3 is real and positive
x4, if Nb ≤ N0b, f4(x4) > 0, x4 is real and positive
n/a , otherwise,
(23)
where
f1(x) = Nb log
(
1 +
αbPt
βbx+ σ2b
)
−N0e log
(
1 +
αePt
βex
)
,
f2(x) = N0b log
(
1 +
Nb
N0b
αbPt
Nb
N0b
βbx+ σ2b
)
−N0e log
(
1 +
αePt
βex
)
,
x1 =
2N0eαeσ
2
b − Ptαbαe (Nb −N0e)
2 (Nbαbβe −N0eαeβb)
+
√
α2bα
2
eβ
2
b P
2
t (Nb −N0e)2 + φ1
2βb (Nbαbβe −N0eαeβb) ,
x2 =
2N0eαeσ
2
b − Ptαbαe (Nb −N0e)
2 (Nbαbβe −N0eαeβb)
−
√
α2bα
2
eβ
2
b P
2
t (Nb −N0e)2 + φ1
2βb (Nbαbβe −N0eαeβb) ,
x3 =
2N0eN0bαeσ
2
b −NbPtαbαe (N0b −N0e)
2Nb (N0bαbβe −N0eαeβb)
+
√
α2bα
2
eβ
2
bP
2
t N
2
b (N0b −N0e)2 + φ2
2Nbβb (N0bαbβe −N0eαeβb) ,
x4 =
2N0eN0bαeσ
2
b −NbPtαbαe (N0b −N0e)
2Nb (N0bαbβe −N0eαeβb)
−
√
α2bα
2
eβ
2
bP
2
t N
2
b (N0b −N0e)2 + φ2
2Nbβb (N0bαbβe −N0eαeβb) ,
with
φ1 = 4NbN0eαbαeβbσ
2
b
(
Ptαbβe − Ptαeβb + βeσ2b
)
,
φ2=4N
2
0bN0eαbαeβbσ
2
b
(
NbPtαbβe−NbPtαeβb+N0bβeσ2b
)
.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 2: Proposition 2 provides the optimal jamming
power that maximizes the worst-case secrecy capacity of the
basic jammer-assisted system. If there is no power constraint
at the jammer, we can simply set the jamming power as P oj
to achieve the best secrecy performance. If there exists a
power constraint at the jammer, say Pj ≤ Pj,max, we should
first check the feasibility of achieving the non-zero worst-
case secrecy capacity, and then set the jamming power as
min(P oj , Pj,max) if the non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity
is achievable.
C. AN Jammer-Assisted System
Based on Theorem 2 and (18), the worst-case secrecy
capacity of the AN jammer-assisted system is given by
Cws =


[
Nb log
(
1 + αbPt
σ2
b
)
−N0e log
(
1 + αePt
βePj
)]+
,
if Nb ≤ N0b[
N0b log(1 +
Nb
N0b
αbPt
σ2
b
)−N0e log
(
1 + αePt
βePj
)]+
,
otherwise.
(24)
Similar to the case of basic jammer-assisted system, we note
that a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity sometimes is
achievable for the AN jammer-assisted system, depending
on the system parameters, such as transmit power, average
channel gains, the spatial constraint at Bob and the number
of antennas at Bob. Consider the scenario where the number
of antennas at Bob, Nb, is controllable and the other system
parameters, i.e., N0b, N0e, αb, βb, αe, βe, Pt and Pj , are fixed.
From (24), we find that a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity
is always achievable by having “enough” receive antennas at
Bob, and the minimum Nb to ensure a non-zero worst-case
9secrecy capacity is given by
Nb,min =


N0e log(1+αePtβePj )
log
(
1+
αbPt
σ2
b
)
+ 1 ,
if N0b log
(
1 + αbPt
σ2
b
)
≥ N0e log
(
1 + αePt
βePj
)
⌊
N0b σb
2
αbPt
((
1 + αePt
βePj
)N0e
N0b − 1
)⌋
+ 1 ,
otherwise.
(25)
In terms of the optimal jammer power that maximizes the
worst-case secrecy capacity, it is wise to have Pj as large as
possible, since the increase of Pj only degrades the capacity
of Eve’s channel but does not affect the capacity of Bob’s
channel. Mathematically, we give the following proof for that
the worst-case secrecy capacity of the AN jammer-assisted
system is a monotonically increasing function of the jamming
power.
Proof: We first rewrite (24) as
Cws =
{
[f1(Pj)]
+
, if Nb ≤ N0b
[f2(Pj)]
+
, otherwise.
(26)
Then, we find that
∂f1(Pj)
∂Pj
=
∂f2(Pj)
∂Pj
=
N0ePtαe(
1 + αePt
βePj
)
ln 2βeP 2j
> 0 (27)
always holds for any positive value of Pj . Thus, the secrecy
capacity of the AN jammer-assisted system is a monotonically
increasing function of the jamming power.
D. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present the numerical results based on
the worst-case analysis. Since the worst-case secrecy capacity
of the wiretap-channel system is always equal to zero, we
do not present the numerical results for the wiretap-channel
system in this subsection but focus on the basic jammer-
assisted system and the AN jammer-assisted system. Besides,
we still adopt the 2D analysis to characterize the spatial
constraints at the receiver side, such that Bob and Eve are
spatially constrained by circular apertures.
We first compare the minimum numbers of Bob’s antennas
to achieve a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity of the
basic jammer-assisted system and the AN jammer-assisted
system. Figure 7 plots Nb,min versus re based on (22) and
(25). As shown in the figure, Nb,min increases with re for
both systems, which indicates that we need more antennas at
Bob to ensure a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity as the
radius of Eve’s spatial constraint increases. In addition, we
note that the increase of Nb,min with respect to re is slow
when re is small, but it becomes fast when re is large. Such
an observation is more clear for the basic jammer-assisted
system compared with that for the AN jammer-assisted system.
Hence, the cost of antennas at Bob to ensure a non-zero worst-
case secrecy capacity is very large when the radius of Eve’s
spatial constraint is large, especially for the basic jammer-
assisted system. When re is very large, i.e., re > rb = 2λ
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Fig. 7. The minimum number of Bob’s antennas for achieving a non-zero
worst-case secrecy capacity versus the radius of Eve’s spatial constraint. The
other system parameters are Pt = 20 dB, Pj = 0 dB, αb = 1, αe = 1, βb =
1, βe = 1, σ
2
b
= 1 and rb = 2λ.
in the figure, the basic jammer-assisted system cannot achieve
a non-zero worst-case secrecy capacity no matter how many
antennas are equipped at Bob. The condition under which the
basic jammer-assisted system always cannot achieve the non-
zero worst-case secrecy capacity is given by (21). In contrast,
the AN jammer-assisted system can always ensure a non-zero
worst-case secrecy capacity by increasing the number of Bob’s
antennas, as long as Eve has a finite spatial constraint.
It is worth pointing out that the minimum number of
receive antennas to ensure a non-zero worst-case secrecy
capacity is determined by not only the spatial constraint at
the eavesdropper but also many other system parameters, such
as the spatial constraint at the legitimate receiver, transmit
power, jamming power, average channel gains and the noise
variance at the receiver. Thus, the result in Figure 7 can
be only regarded as an example to illustrate the required
values of Nb,min for different values of re. The required
Nb,min is not necessary to be extremely large for a very large
value of re. For example, the required Nb,min is equal to
116 for re = 10λ in an AN jammer-assisted system with
rb = 8λ, αb = 10, αe = 10, βb = 10 and βe = 10.
Now, we depict the worst-case secrecy capacity for different
spatial constraints at Eve. Figure 8 plots Cws versus re for
the basic jammer-assisted system and the AN jammer-assisted
system according to (20) and (24), respectively. The number
of Bob’s antennas is chosen equal to the saturation number of
receive antennas at Bob, i.e., Nb = N0b = 37. As the figure
shows, Cws decreases with re for both systems. Comparing
the two curves, we note that the worst-case secrecy capacity
of the basic jammer-assisted system is always smaller than
that for the AN jammer-assisted system. In addition, the
difference of Cws between the two systems keeps the same
for different values of re. This can be explained as follows.
The basic jamming signals and the AN jamming signals have
the same effect on Eve’s channel while different effects on
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Fig. 8. The worst-case secrecy capacity versus the radius of Eve’s spatial
constraint. The other system parameters are Pt = 20 dB, Pj = 0 dB, αb =
1, αe = 1, βb = 1, βe = 1, σ
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Fig. 9. The worst-case secrecy capacity versus the jamming power. The other
system parameters are Pt = 20 dB, αb = 1, αe = 1, βb = 1, βe = 1, σ2b =
1, rb = 1.5λ, re = 1λ and Nb = 30.
Bob’s channel. Hence, the difference of Cws between the two
systems is actually due to the difference of the capacity of
Bob’s channel subject to different jamming techniques, and it
is not related to Eve’s channel condition or spatial constraint.
Therefore, the difference of Cws between the two curves in the
figure keeps the same for different values of re.
Finally, we illustrate the impact of jamming power on the
worst-case secrecy capacity. Figure 9 plots Cws versus Pj for
both the basic jammer-assisted system and the AN jammer-
assisted system. As shown in the figure, the value of Cws for
the basic jammer-assisted system increases with Pj when Pj
is small, but it decreases with Pj when Pj goes large. There
exists an optimal value of Pj that maximizes Cws for the basic
jammer-assisted system, i.e., Pj = 3.43 dB in the figure. By
using the analytical results given in Proposition 2, we also
obtain that P oj for the given scenario is equal to 3.43 dB. This
verifies the optimality of P oj obtained in our analytical results.
In contrast, the value of Cws for the AN jammer-assisted
system always increases with Pj , which is also consistent with
our analytical results. Moreover, comparing the basic jammer-
assisted system and the AN jammer-assisted system, we note
that the difference of Cws between the two curves increases
with Pj all the time.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we introduced the spatial constraint into
physical layer security for multi-antenna systems, which pro-
vides an approach to study the secrecy capacity without
knowing the number of eavesdropper antennas. We considered
basic secure communication systems with spatial constraints
at the receiver side. Specifically, we studied the wiretap-
channel system, the basic jammer-assisted system and the
AN jammer-assisted system, and derived the expressions for
secrecy capacity of each system. We found that a non-zero
worst-case secrecy capacity is achievable with the assist of
jamming signals, even if the eavesdropper is equipped with
infinite number of antennas. Moreover, the optimal jamming
power that maximizes the worst-case secrecy capacity was
obtained. We highlight that the major contribution of this
paper is to address the practically important problem of how
to study secure communications without knowing the number
of eavesdropper antennas, and hope this work can be a good
inspiration for future researchers to design novel physical
layer techniques to efficiently secure wireless communications
without the information of eavesdropper antennas.
As a first step of studying the effects of spatial constraints
on physical layer security, this work considered a simple
scenario with spatial constraints at the receiver side only. A
natural future work is to extend the study by investigating
the effects of spatial constraints at both the transmitter and
the receiver sides. To this end, a limited number of transmit
antennas with the spatial constraint at the transmitter should be
considered. However, it is worth mentioning that the extension
is non-trivial, since the secrecy capacity would depend on
instantaneous channel realizations even if the number of
transmit antennas goes to infinity. In the scenario with spatial
constraints at both the transmitter and the receiver sides, the
study of having legitimate CSI available at the transmitter side
is also of great interest, while this paper assumed the legitimate
CSI available only at the receiver side. With the legitimate
CSI available at the transmitter, how to optimally design the
transmit precoding is an interesting problem to investigate.
Another future work direction is to evaluate the achievable
secrecy capacity for different antenna array configurations
from a signal-processing perspective. Note that the results in
this paper were mainly obtained from an information-theoretic
perspective by assuming the optimal antenna placement at the
receiver side.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The capacity of Bob or Eve’s channel can be written as
Ci = log
∣∣∣∣INi + αiHiQxHHiσ2i
∣∣∣∣ , (28)
where Qx denotes the covariance matrix of x, i.e., Qx =
E
{
xxH
}
. Since Alice has no instantaneous CSI of Bob and
there is sufficient space at Alice for independent transmit
antenna allocation, the best transmission strategy is to have the
transmit signal vector composed of statistically independent
equal power components, each with a Gaussian distribution.
Then, the covariance matrix of x is equal to Qx = PtNt INt ,
and the channel capacity becomes to
Ci = log
∣∣∣∣INi + αiPtσ2iNtHiHHi
∣∣∣∣ , (29)
where
HiH
H
i =
Nt∑
t=1
hith
H
it . (30)
Considering a large number of transmit antennas (Nt → ∞)
and sufficient space for placing transmit antennas (independent
hit), the correlation matrix at the receiver in (2) becomes to
Ri → 1
Nt
Nt∑
t=1
hith
H
it . (31)
Note that there is no expectation over channel realizations
in (31), since 1
Nt
∑Nt
t=1 hith
H
it = E
{
1
Nt
∑Nt
t=1 hith
H
it
}
when
Nt →∞. Then, the channel capacity with a large number of
sufficiently separated transmit antennas is approximated by
Ci ≈ log
∣∣∣∣INi + αiPtσ2i Ri
∣∣∣∣ . (32)
We highlight that the approximation by (32) provides good
accuracy even if the number of transmit antennas is finite.
To examine the accuracy of the approximation by (32), we
compare the true value of Ci obtained by (29) and the
approximation obtain by (32) for given receive antenna array
configurations. The simulation result is presented by Figure 10.
The number of transmit antennas is set as a large but finite
number, Nt = 100. The number of receive antennas is in the
range of 1 ≤ Ni ≤ Nt = 100. We consider two different
antenna array configurations, which are the uniform linear
array (ULA) and the uniform circular array (UCA), in a fixed
circular aperture at the receiver with ri = 1λ. Since the
number of transmit antennas is set as a finitely large number
but not infinity, the capacity result by (29) would depend on
the instantaneous channel realization. Thus, the “true value”
in Figure 10 is the average value of Ci obtained by (29) over
different channel realizations. It is evident from Figure 10 that
the difference between the true value and the approximation
is very small for the whole range of Ni, which indicates that
the approximation by (32) provides good accuracy even if the
transmitter has a finite number of antennas.
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Fig. 10. Without jamming signals: Ci versus Ni. The other system
parameters are Nt = 100, ri = 1λ, Pt = 10 dB, αi = 1, σ2i = 1.
For the receiver with Ni optimally-placed antennas in a
fixed aperture region, the channel capacity in (32) can be
further approximated by [19, Chapter 3],
Ci ≈
{
Ni log(1 +
αiPt
σ2
i
) , if Ni ≤ N0i
N0i log(1 +
Ni
N0i
αiPt
σ2
i
) , otherwise, (33)
where the expression of N0i for a 2D circular aperture or
a 3D spherical aperture is given by (9). The Ci in (33) is
derived with the approximation that Jm
(
2pi
λ
ri
)→ 0 for m ≥
⌈pieri/λ⌉ + 1, where Jm(·) denotes the Bessel function of
order m. Such an approximation is shown to be very accurate
in [19].
Finally, substituting (33) into (8) completes the proof of
Proposition 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The capacity of Bob or Eve’s channel subject to the basic
jamming signals is written as [33, Section 3.1]
Ci = log
∣∣∣INi + αiHiQxHHi (βiGiQwGHi + σ2i INi)−1∣∣∣ ,
(34)
where Qx and Qw denote the covariance matrices of x
and w1, respectively, i.e., Qx = E
{
xxH
}
and Qw =
E
{
w1w
H
1
}
. Since neither Alice nor Helen has the instan-
taneous CSI to Bob or Eve, the equal power allocation at the
transmit antennas is adopted at both Alice and Helen, and the
covariance matrices of x and w1 are equal to Qx = PtNt INt
and Qw = PjNj INj , respectively. Then, the channel capacity
becomes to
Ci = log
∣∣∣∣∣INi + αiPtNt HiHHi
(
βiPj
Nj
GiG
H
i + σ
2
i INi
)
−1
∣∣∣∣∣ .
(35)
Considering the large number of transmit antennas (Nt →
∞, Nj → ∞) and sufficient space for placing transmit
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Fig. 11. With jamming signals: Ci versus Ni. The other system parameters
are Nt = Nj = 100, ri = 1λ, Pt = 10 dB, Pj = 0 dB αi = 1, βi =
1, σ2i = 1.
antennas (independent hit and independent git), we have
1
Nt
Nt∑
t=1
hith
H
it =
1
Nj
Nj∑
t=1
gitg
H
it = Ri, (36)
where Ri is the correlation matrix at the receiver side. Note
that Ri is determined by the receive antenna correlations.
Therefore, the channel capacity can be approximated by
Ci ≈ log
∣∣∣INi + αiPtRi (βiPjRi + σ2i INi)−1∣∣∣
= log
∣∣∣∣INi +
(
αiPt
σ2i
+
βiPj
σ2i
)
Ri
∣∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣∣INi + βiPjσ2i Ri
∣∣∣∣ . (37)
We highlight that the approximation by (37) provides good
accuracy even if the number of transmit antennas and the
number of jamming antennas are finite. To examine the
accuracy of the approximation by (37), we compare the true
value of Ci obtained by (35) and the approximation obtain
by (37) for given receive antenna array configurations. The
simulation result is presented by Figure 11. The number of
transmit antennas and the number of jamming antennas are
set as Nt = Nj = 100. The number of receive antennas is in
the range of 1 ≤ Ni ≤ Nt = Nj = 100. We still consider two
different antenna array configurations, i.e., the ULA and the
UCA, in a fixed circular aperture at the receiver with ri = 1λ.
It is evident from Figure 11 that the difference between the true
value and the approximation is very small for the whole range
of Ni. This confirms that the approximation by (37) provides
good accuracy even if the transmitter and the jammer have
finite numbers of antennas.
For the receiver with Ni optimally-placed antennas in a
fixed aperture region, the channel capacity in (37) can be
further approximated by
Ci ≈


Ni log
(
1 + αiPt
βiPj+σ
2
i
)
, if Ni ≤ N0i
N0i log
(
1 +
Ni
N0i
αiPt
Ni
N0i
βiPj+σ
2
i
)
, otherwise.
(38)
Still, the Ci in (38) is derived with the approximation that
Jm
(
2pi
λ
ri
)→ 0 for m ≥ ⌈pieri/λ⌉+ 1.
Finally, substituting (38) into (8) completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since the AN jamming signals do not degrade Bob’s chan-
nel, we derive the capacity of Bob’s channel directly from (33),
which is given by
Cb ≈
{
Nb log(1 +
αbPt
σ2
b
) , if Nb ≤ N0b
N0b log(1 +
Nb
N0b
αbPt
σ2
b
) , otherwise. (39)
Now, we derive the capacity of Eve’s channel subject to
the AN jamming signals. The received signal vector at Eve is
written as
ye =
√
αeHex+
√
βeKv + ne, (40)
where K = GeZ represents the equivalent channel for
the vector v to Eve. Due to the orthonormality of Z, the
Ne × (Nj − Nb) matrix K has circularly symmetric i.i.d.
complex Gaussian distributed elements. Then, the capacity of
Eve’s channel is written as
Ce = log
∣∣∣INe + αeHeQxHHe (βeKQvKH + σ2eINe)−1∣∣∣ ,
(41)
where Qx and Qv denote the covariance matrices of x and v,
respectively, i.e., Qx = E
{
xxH
}
and Qv = E
{
vvH
}
. With
the equal power allocation at Alice, we have Qx = PtNt INt .
Also, since v is chosen as i.i.d. complex Gaussian random
variables, we have Qv = PjNj−Nb INj−Nb . Then, the capacity
of Eve’s channel becomes to
Ce = log
∣∣∣∣∣INe + αePtRe
(
βePj
Nj −NbKK
H + σ2eINe
)
−1
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
(42)
where Re is the correlation matrix at Eve, and is deter-
mined by the receive antenna correlations at Eve. Define
K = [k1 · · ·ki · · ·kNj−Nb ], Z = [z1 · · · zi · · · zNj−Nb ], and
hence ki = Hezi.
If we can prove that ki are independent, the correlation
matrix would converge to R→ 1
Nj−Nb
KKH as (Nj−Nb)→
∞, and the capacity of Eve’s channel could be written as
Ce = log
∣∣∣INe + αePtRe (βePjRe + σ2eINe)−1∣∣∣ . (43)
Having (43), we can derive the channel capacity of spatially-
constrained Eve which is the same as (38).
Therefore, in the following, we need only to prove that ki
are independent to complete the proof of Theorem 2. For any
km and kn where m 6= n, we have
[km−E {km}]H [kn−E {kn}] = zHmHHe Hezn (a)= zHmzn (b)= 0,
(44)
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where (a) is because of the independence between transmit
antennas and (b) is because of the orthogonality of Z. Thus, ki
are pairwise uncorrelated. In addition, multivariate normality
and no correlation implies independence. Multivariate normal-
ity and pairwise independence implies mutual independence.
Since ki are multivariate normally distributed, ki are mutually
independent. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We first rewrite (20) as
Cws =
{
[f1(x = Pj)]
+
, if Nb ≤ N0b
[f2(x = Pj)]
+ , otherwise. (45)
If Nb ≤ N0b, we can obtain two possible stationary points of
f1(x), i.e., x1 and x2, by taking the derivative of f1(x) with
respect to x and equating it to zero. If Cws is not always equal
to zero, P oj should exist and be equal to one of the stationary
points, since limx→0 f(x) → −∞ and limx→∞ f(x) → 0.
Then, we determine P oj by examining the values of x1 and
x2. When neither x1 nor x2 is real and positive, it is not
applicable to determine the optimal value of Pj , because the
stationary point for f1(x) does not exist, and Cws is always
equal to zero for any value of Pj . Similarly, if Nb > N0b,
we can obtain two possible stationary points of f2(x), i.e., x3
and x4, by taking the derivative of f2(x) with respect to x
and equating it to zero. Then, we determine P oj by examining
the values of x3 and x4. When neither x3 nor x4 is real and
positive, it is not applicable to determine the optimal value of
Pj , because Cws is always equal to zero for any value of Pj .
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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